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of	Turkey’s	politics;	 in	 effect,	 it	 changed	Turkey’s	politics	 ir-
reversibly.	The	state	based	on	secular	elites	representing	mili-
tary	and	state	administration	circles	and	on	a	secular-nation-



































a	 single	man	whose	 power	 is	 not	 unlimited	 but	who	 is	 still	










roeconomic	 results	 are	good,	 and	 the	political	 supremacy	of	


















closer	 to	 countries	 like	 Russia.	 However,	 given	 the	 scale	 of	
internal	 diversity	 inside	 Turkey	 and	 the	 growing	 social	 po-













































































1	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 loss	 of	 Arab	 territories,	 the	 Armenian	 Geno-































ideology	 based	 on	 Westernisation,	 secularism,	 Turkish	 nation-
alism	and	the	cult	of	Mustafa	Kemal	himself	 (which	took	on	an	






half	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 has	 contributed	 to	 a	 further	 consolida-
tion	 of	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 military,	 administrational	
and	judicial	establishment	in	the	life	of	the	state.	Even	though	the	
that	 ‘Turkishness’	 became	 redefined	 as	 an	 ethno-cultural	 (but	 not	 ra-
cial)	identity.	
2	 As	a	consequence	of	 the	 thorough	 language	reforms	 implemented	 in	Tur-
key	 throughout	 the	 20th	 century,	 the	 historical	 Ottoman	 language	 –	 the	
language	of	the	upper	classes,	which	was	used	in	documents	and	literature	






































The	 factors	which	 kept	 Turkey	 distant	 from	 the	West	 included	












tanbul,	Ankara	and	 Izmir,	who	are	political	 and	economic	 leaders	versus	
the	conservative	‘Black	Turks’	from	central	Anatolia	who	are	usually	worse	
educated	and	in	fact	underprivileged.


















not	fit	 in	with	 the	model	of	 citizen	resulting	 from	 the	Kemalist	
ideology:	a	secularised	or	moderately	religious	Sunni	Turk.	
The	 ‘deep	state’	 (derin devlet),	a	network	of	 secret,	 informal	and	
mutually	autonomous	groups	of	 representatives	of	military	and	
civilian	 elites,	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 which	 remains	 a	 mystery	 to	
















Treason has pervaded my heroic race
There is suffering and hatred in all hearts
My enemies are not valiant, they are cowards
A Turk may not have other friend and patron but another Turk 
Let’s rejoice at the principles our Father [Ataturk] gave us 
Let’s run towards the purposes he showed us
Turkey, Turkey, my paradise
My unequalled nation
My Father, leader of Turkishness and youth
This great fatherland is your achievement
We, the whole nation, are following in Your footsteps, enjoying the love 






























The	 snap	 election	 held	 in	 2002	was	 a	 turning	 point.	 The	 army	
did	not	conceal	 its	 ire	when	the	election	was	won	by	the	Justice	
and	Development	Party	(AKP)	which	had	been	formed	a	year	ear-
lier	 and	 drew	 upon	 the	 tradition	 of	 political	 Islam.	 The	 voting	
6	 The	 intensified	 activity	 of	 the	 armed	 and	 terrorist	Kurdish	underground	
forces	(PKK),	the	escalation	of	radical	Islamic	sentiments	(e.g.	the	massacre	
of	Alevis	 in	Sivas	 in	 July	 1993)	and	 the	 still	unresolved	murders	of	public	
persons	and	terrorist	attacks.	
7	 The	prime	minister	 changed	eight	 times	between	 1989	and	2001	 (without	
taking	into	account	government	reconstruction).	In	1997,	the	army	brought	
down	the	government	for	the	fourth	time	in	the	Republic’s	history,	this	time	
without	bringing	 tanks	 to	 the	streets	and	without	 introducing	a	military	
regime,	but	instead	with	pressure	from	the	republican	establishment:	the	
army,	 the	 senior	 state	 officials,	 the	media	 and	non-governmental	 organi-
sations.
8	 The	financial	 crises	 in	 1994,	 1999,	and	 the	one	which	especially	painfully	
affected	the	public	–	in	2001,	“so-called”	black	Wednesday.	Annual	GDP	fell	
by:	4.7%,	 3.4%	and	5.7%	respectively	 (World	Bank	data).	 In	2001,	over	one	
million	 jobs	were	 liquidated,	wages	were	 reduced	 by	 20%,	 and	 the	 Turk-














































ii. the aKp epoch – fRoM deMocRacy  
to autocRacy
The	 Justice	 and	Development	 Party	 has	 ruled	 Turkey	 by	 itself	
without	 interruption	 since	 its	 first	 electoral	 victory	 in	 2002.	





momentous	 and	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 irreversible.	 The	 process	 of	
transformation	process	 still	 seems	 far	 from	over.	For	 this	 rea-















10	 This	 process	 was	 sealed	 by	 the	 amendment	 of	 article	 35	 of	 the	 internal	
regulations	of	 the	Turkish	Armed	Forces	 (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Iç Hizmet 




















































































































decimated	 the	diversity	on	 the	Turkish	party	political	 scene	
in	the	election	in	2002.	In	effect,	the	AKP	has	in	fact	had	no	
political	competitors	until	present,	and	the	Turkish	public	is	
predominantly	 interested	 in	 issues	concerning	everyday	 life	
rather	 than	 political	 standards.	 As	 Kemal	 Kilicdaroglu,	 the	
leader	of	 the	main	opposition	grouping,	 the	Republican	Peo-
ple’s	Party	(CHP),	has	admitted	“democracy	and	the	freedom	




















































i)	 As	 the	 stimuli	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 political	 reforms	
weakened,	the	West	became	less	appealing	and	Erdogan’s	per-
sonal	dominance	strengthened,	Turkish	politics	over	the	years	































attention	 to	 the	 Arab	 world,	 stirring	 up	 the	 hopes	 that	 the	
Turkish	 regional	 leadership	 promised	 by	 Davutoglu,	 which	
had	previously	been	 in	 the	 realm	of	 cherished	but	not	quite	
real	desires,	could	finally	be	realised.

















l)	 All	 these	 factors	 have	 additionally	 been	 coupled	with	 Presi-
dent	Erdogan’s	personal	features:	megalomania,	authoritarian	






























































The	new	party	was	 formed	 in	 response	 to	disillusionment	with	












In	 contrast	 to	 Milli	 Gorus,	 the	 AKP	 presented	 itself	 as	 a	 con-
servative-democratic	 grouping,	 which	 wanted	 EU	 membership	
and	styled	itself	as	a	Muslim	equivalent	of	Christian	Democrats,	
which	was	a	novelty	on	 the	Turkish	political	 scene.	The	party’s	











































decade	 of	 the	 21st	 century	 had	 been	 taken	 before	 the	 AKP	 took	
power.	 These	 included	 Kemal	 Dervis’s	 programme	 of	 financial	




































The	 reforms	were	 also	 continued	 in	 subsequent	 years,	 albeit	 at	
a	 slower	 rate.	 Amendments	 were	 made	 to	 the	 foundations	 act	






























In	 effect,	 the	 AKP	 established	 civilian	 control	 over	 the	 army,	











The	AKP’s	 rule	has	 resulted	 in	a	kind	of	 ‘desacralisation’	 of	 the	




ment	 of	 the	 non-governmental	 sector,	 first	 attempts	 to	 initiate	
public	debate	on	the	taboo	issues,	i.e.	the	Armenian	Genocide	in	




After	 decades	 of	 nationalist	 indoctrination,	 the	 AKP’s	 rhetoric	






dings	 to	couples	whose	marriage	 is	not	 registered	at	a	 secular	 institution	

































first	attempt	 in	 the	history	of	 the	Republic	of	Turkey	was	made	
to	launch	a	political	peace	process	aimed	at	causing	the	Kurdish	
guerrilla	 forces	 (PKK)	 to	 lay	 down	 their	 arms	 in	 exchange	 for	
greater	autonomy	offered	to	regions	inhabited	by	Kurds	(as	part	
of	the	decentralisation	of	the	country	as	a	whole).	The	moves	made	
as	part	of	 the	concessions	offered	 to	 the	Kurdish	population	 in-
cluded	the	creation	of	a	national	TV	channel	which	broadcast	pro-







more	 than	20	years	 (martial	 law	 in	 1978–1987	and	 the	 state	of	emergency	
in	1987–2002),	paramilitary	militias	(so-called	‘village	guards’),	radical	Is-









































antee	 that	 state	 officials	may	 face	 criminal	 liability	 for	 abuse	 of	
power,	 and	 the	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 and	 central	 regulators	
can	still	be	used	by	politicians	for	their	own	ends.	Despite	the	pro-
found	changes,	Turkey	(both	as	a	state	and	as	a	nation)	remained	
under	 the	 influence	 of	 a	 culture	 permeated	 with	 authority,	 hi-
erarchy,	 violence,	 impunity,	 the	 conservative-patriarchal	 spirit,	


















iV. the tuRKish ciVilisational leap














2002	 was	 aptly	 reflected	 in	 the	 AKP’s	 electoral	 slogan	 in	 2011	
“Hayaldi gerçek oldu”	 (“What	was	 a	 dream	has	 become	 reality”).	




23	 Cf.	http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/verican.php,	computer	graphics	 titled	2,6 
milyon yetişkin kadin okuryazar değil
24	 The	average	age	of	a	resident	of	Sirnak	province	bordering	on	Iraq	is	slightly	



























most	US$19,000	 in	 2013	 (data	 from	 the	 IMF).	 The	 percentage	 of	
households	 qualified	 as	 the	middle	 class	 increased	 from	 18%	 in	
1993	 to	 41%	 in	 201028.	The	percentage	of	people	 living	below	 the	
poverty	line	in	the	first	decade	of	the	21th	century	fell	from	around	












motorways,	 high-speed	 railways	 and	 hospitals.	 In	 Istanbul,	
a	 railway	 tunnel	 running	 under	 the	 Bosphorus	 has	 been	 built,	
and	a	third	bridge	across	the	strait	and	the	third	airport	are	un-
der	 construction.	 The	 urbanisation	 of	 the	 country	 has	 gained	
28	 The	 middle	 class	 as	 defined	 according	 to	 the	 World	 Bank’s	 criteria,	 i.e.	
a	minimum	of	US$10	 (PPP)	daily	per	person.	Data	 from	 the	World	Bank’s	

























Bank’s	 data).	 Rapid	 development	 has	 been	 seen	 not	 only	 in	 the	




Over	 50	 state	 universities	 and	 over	 40	 private	 universities	were	
established	between	2006	and	201432.	The	number	of	Internet	us-
ers	 increased	from	11	per	 100	 in	2002	to	46	per	 100	 in	2013.	Even	
though	the	knowledge	of	 foreign	 languages	 is	still	not	something	
the	Turkish	public	can	be	especially	proud	about,	Turkey	is	among	









unprecedented	 construction	 and	 consumption	 boom	 (consump-
tion	accounts	for	70%	of	Turkey’s	GDP),	financed	largely	by	loans.	
This	was	possible	because	 the	monetary	and	credit	policies	had	














































V. on the Road to autocRacy
A	run	of	electoral	successes	and	victories	in	confrontations	with	







alyst	 for	Erdogan’s	building	of	his	personal	power,	 for	 the	rapid	
deterioration	of	legal	and	democratic	standards	and	the	margin-
alisation	of	moderate	politicians	in	the	AKP.
Erdogan	 became	 president	 after	 his	 victory	 in	 the	 election	 in	
August	2014.	Even	though	in	the	Turkish	political	system	this	is	
a	 non-partisan	 and	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 a	 ceremonial	 position,	 Er-
dogan	 has	 remained	 the	 unquestioned	 party	 and	 government	
leader.	He	is	the	one	who	makes	the	key	political	and	staffing	de-
cisions,	he	often	chairs	government	meetings	and	holds	top-level	
































influence	 in	 the	 government	 party,	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 busi-
ness,	 and	 the	media.	Erdogan	wants	 to	 strengthen	and	 legally	






from	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 replacing	 them	 with	 new	
people	who	 are	 completely	 dependent	 upon	 him.	 This	 process	
will	 be	 crowned	with	 the	 parliamentary	 election	 in	 June	 this	
year.	Given	the	internal	party	regulations	which	were	adopted	
in	 the	early	days	of	 the	AKP	and	are	at	 this	moment	very	con-
venient	 to	 Erdogan38,	 over	 70	 of	 the	 AKP’s	 most	 experienced	
politicians	 will	 be	 eliminated	 from	 politics,	 including	 the	 in-







Erdogan	 dubbed	 “the	 most	 important	 state	 institution”40	 is	 an	
important	element	of	Erdogan’s	government	system.	The	head	of	
MIT,	Hakan	Fidan,	 from	the	moment	of	his	nomination	 in	2010	
was	 reputed	 to	be	Erdogan’s	 closest	aide	 (Erdogan	branded	him	

















































43	 One	example	of	 this	was	 the	pardoning	 (under	government	pressure	and	
despite	 hard	 evidence)	 of	 four	 former	 ministers	 involved	 in	 corruption	
scandals	which	were	revealed	as	a	consequence	of	the	wave	of	arrests	in	De-











































46	 At	 the	 end	 of	 February	 2015,	 the	 number	 of	 individuals	 who	 measures	
were	taken	against	in	connection	with	the	alleged	slander	of	the	president	
reached	67	(summons	to	give	statements,	investigation,	arrest,	indictment,	
fine	 imposed,	etc.).	The	 legal	grounds	for	 these	measures	are	provided	by	
article	 299	 of	 the	 Turkish	 criminal	 code,	which	 defines	 the	 crime	 of	 “of-
fence	of	Turkishness,	the	Republic,	state	authorities	or	institutions.”	These	
measures	have	been	taken	for	example	 in	response	to	putting	up	posters,	
chanting	 political	 slogans,	 posting	 on	 social	 networking	 services	 or	 be-






























more	 than	 ten	news	 channels),	 Freedom	House	 Foundation	has	
classified	 this	 country	 as	 ‘not	 free’	 in	 terms	 of	 freedom	 of	 the	
press.	 The	 greater	 part	 of	 large	media	 outlets	 form	 elements	 of	
multi-sectoral	business	conglomerates	which	are	extremely	sus-
ceptible	to	political	pressure	due	to	access	to	lucrative	state	orders	
they	 are	 offered.	 The	 newspapers	with	 a	 clear	 pro-government	
bias	account	for	around	40%	of	the	press50,	and	a	significant	sec-
tion	of	the	other	media	outlets	apply	self-censorship	at	the	edito-







ter	 originated	 from	 Turkey.	 Cf.	 http://www.statista.com/chart/3217/twit-
ter-content-removal-requests/






















Almost	 all	 news	 channels	 broadcast	 each	 public	 speech	 of	 the	
president	in extenso	(they	are	sometimes	broadcast	on	more	than	
ten	TV	channels	simultaneously).	The	scale	of	government	pres-
sure	 on	 the	 media	 was	 evident	 for	 example	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	















Since	 the	mass	 protests	 in	 summer	 2013	 (over	 8,000	 people	 in-
































people	were	beaten	or	 injured	and	over	 11,000	were	arrested	 in	
2014	as	a	consequence	of	police	suppression	of	protests	and	dem-















ously	 murdered	 by	 chronically	 ‘unidentified	 perpetrators’,	 and	
opposition	parties	and	non-governmental	organisations	have	not	
been	 banned	 as	 yet,	 which	 makes	 present-day	 Turkey	 distinct	
from	the	Kemalist	state.	






























Vi. tuRKey’s ciVilisational identity  
undeR aKp Rule 














rus	 Bridge	 was	 named	 after	 Sultan	Mehmed	 II	 the	 Conqueror,	
and	a	banknote	with	his	portrait	was	 issued58).	However,	when	









































to	 be	 admitted	 to	 universities,	 and	 their	 number	 has	 radically	
increased	(by	73%	between	2010	and	2014	alone)59.	An	education	
reform	 was	 introduced	 allowing	 students	 to	 be	 transferred	 to	
imam-hatip	schools	after	four	years	of	education	(and	not	eight	as	
had	previously	been	the	case).	Age	restrictions	for	Koranic	course	









equivalent	of	 160%	of	 the	budget	of	 the	Ministry	of	 Internal	Af-






















antine	 churches	which	had	 functioned	as	mosques	 in	 the	Otto-
man	era	and	had	the	status	of	museums	in	republican	times).	This	
has	 happened	 to	 Hagia	 Sophia	 churches	 in	 Iznik/Nicaea	 (2011)	
and	 Trabzon/Trebizond	 (2013).	 Similar	 speculations	 crop	 up	 on	
a	regular	basis	regarding	the	Hagia	Sophia	basilica	in	Istanbul.	
Only	 some	 of	 the	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	 government	 to	 promote	
conservative	 values,	 including	 Recep	 Tayyip	 Erdogan’s	 wrath-
ful	tirades	on	moral	issues62,	have	translated	into	real	changes	of	
legislation,	but	they	have	significantly	affected	the	atmosphere	of	
public	 life	 in	Turkey.	For	example,	 the	president	has	openly	ap-
pealed	to	the	public	to	strengthen	so-called	‘neighbours’	pressure’	
(mahalle baskısı)	on	people	drinking	alcohol63.
As	 regards	 the	 state	 identity,	 the	Ottoman	Empire	has	not	only	
been	rehabilitated	under	the	AKP’s	rule	(which	seems	to	be	a	nat-
ural	move	after	decades	of	ideologically	motivated	negation),	the	
state	 leaders	 are	 even	 keen	 to	 present	 modern	 Turkey	 as	 pre-
destined	 to	play	 the	role	of	a	neo-Ottoman	power	 that	will	 lead	
Muslims	from	across	the	globe	and	protect	their	rights.	Hence	its	










































































Vii. the tuRKish public undeR aKp Rule
The	first	period	of	 the	AKP’s	rule	gave	Turkey	10	years	of	social	











process	 in	 a	 democracy.	 Non-governmental	 organisations	 rep-




































is	 an	 effect	 of	 the	 new	 communication	 technologies,	 capitalism	
and	a	rapid	urbanisation66.	
The	AKP’s	retreat	from	the	liberal-democratic	path,	followed	by	
a	 sudden	regress,	 and	 the	policy	of	deliberate	polarisation	have	
made	public	sentiment	very	unstable	and	has	divided	the	public.	
























twitter.com/metropoll/status/561184853790830592/photo/1.	 The	 swing	 in	
















Viii. conclusions and foRecasts
The	AKP’s	rule	has	changed	Turkey	in	a	strong	and	irreversible	
way.	However,	 it	 is	 still	difficult	 to	predict	how	 the	 situation	































































sation	 of	 views	 is	 escalating.	 Turkey’s	 geographic	 proximity	 and	
involvement	in	the	Syrian	conflict	poses	the	threat	that	instability	

































































paper	Today’s Zaman),	 banks,	 companies,	 charities,	non-govern-
mental	organisations,	etc.	are	linked	to	the	Gulen	Movement.	
Education	 is	 one	 of	 the	 movement’s	 pillars	 outside	 Turkey.	 It	




In	 his	 official	 teachings,	 Gulen	 emphasises	 the	 need	 to	 com-


















conservative	 Muslim	 values	 among	 the	 people	 within	 its	 orbit	
(especially	school	children).	As	a	socio-political	circle,	the	Gulen	




The	Gulen	Movement	 formed	an	alliance	with	 the	AKP	 in	2001.	
The	 government	 party	 and	 Prime	 Minister	 Erdogan	 himself	
brought	a	strong	political	mandate	to	this	alliance,	while	the	Gu-












tem.	As	regards	 this	 issue,	 the	movement	remained	outside	 the	
AKP’s	effective	control,	set	the	tempo	and	the	scale	of	the	process	








































Fidan,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 civilian	 secret	 services	who	 is	 Erdogan’s	
close	aide	(he	was	summoned	to	give	statements	as	a	suspect	in	
a	 case	 launched	 against	 an	 illegal	 Kurdish	 organisation),	 and,	






him	 as	 prime	minister,	 to	 completely	 destroy	 the	 Gulen	Move-
ment	 inside	 and	 outside	 Turkey	 (these	 have	 included	 efforts	 to	

































The	 president	 has	 a	 strong	 political	mandate	 and	 concentrated	


































Regardless	of	 the	obvious	 internal	political	context	 (the	conflict	
between	Erdogan	and	the	Gulen	Movement),	 it	appears	that	 the	
suspicions	 that	members	of	 the	government	 elite	have	been	 in-
volved	 in	corruption	seem	to	be	well-grounded.	Telephone	calls	
of	the	most	senior	state	officials,	including	Muammer	Guler,	the	







































In	 the	 court’s	 opinion,	 those	 sentenced	 in	 the	 Ergenekon	 case	
were	guilty	of	membership	 in	a	 secret	organisation	which,	af-







government.	The	 coup	was	 to	be	preceded	by	 several	 terrorist	
attacks	 staged	 in	 Istanbul	and	 the	 shooting	down	of	a	Turkish	
fighter	airplane	above	the	Aegean	Sea	(which	would	have	been	
blamed	on	Greece).	














At	 the	 same	 time,	 from	 the	present	perspective,	many	 facts	 in-























once	 the	 confrontation	 between	 the	 AKP	 government	 and	 the	
Fethullah	Gulen	Movement	 escalated,	 a	 large	part	of	 those	 sen-
tenced	 (including	230	 in	 connection	with	 the	Balyoz	 case)	were	
released	from	prison	in	2014	(on	various	legal	grounds).	The	jour-








fessor	 at	 Princeton	University	 and	 son-in-law	 of	 one	 of	 the	 generals	 sen-
tenced).
74	 Cf.	http://www.diken.com.tr/baransu-balyoz-belgelerini-altan-congar-
ogur-ve-tayizle-birlikte-inceledik/	
75	 Cf.	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-were-deceived-erdogan-says-
accusing-parallel-structure-of-misinformation.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79
936&NewsCatID=338	
